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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order reversing the magistrate's 
denial of Finnicum's motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
After Finnicum was arrested for driving under the influence and tests 
established that her BAG was .26/.25, the state charged Finnicum with driving 
under the influence, enhanced for an excessive blood alcohol content. (R., p.5; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, "Page 3 of 3".) Finnicum filed a motion to suppress, 
specifically contending that law enforcement "had unlawfully entered her home to 
seize her during the course of their investigation." (R., pp.17-20, 55; Supp. Hrg. 
Tr., p.1, Ls.13-18, p.3, Ls.15-17.) 
At the suppression hearing, the parties stipulated to the facts as reflected 
in the report of the arresting officer, Deputy McFarland, supplemented with the 
testimony of the backup officer, Deputy Vrevich (R., pp.23, 56-57; Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
p.1, Ls.13-22, p.3, Ls.18-22, p.27, Ls.16-20). Deputy McFarland reported the 
following: 
On 9/25/05 at approx. 1756 hours I along with (M) Dep. Vrevich 
[was] dispatched to respond to a possible domestic dispute at 
18363 W. Riverview Dr. While en route to the call Dispatch notified 
us that the female half had left the scene driving a white Chevy 
Blazer and was possibly intoxicated. Dep. Vrevich was checking 
the area and also advised Post Falls of a possible intoxicated 
driver. I arrived on scene at approx. 1810 hours [where] I met, 
(W/RP) Arthur M. Finnicum. Arthur and his girlfriend were waiting 
at the top of his driveway on Riverview Rd. to speak with me 
reference the possible domestic dispute. 
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Arthur said that he and his mother, (S) Peggy J. Finnicum got into a 
verbal argument earlier that evening because Arthur believed that 
she needed to stop drinking. Arthur said that Peggy got upset and 
said, "Fuck you!" repeatedly. Arthur said he did not know what to 
do so he called his father for advice. Arthur said his father told him 
to call the police. Arthur said when he called the police Peggy left 
the house driving her white Chevy Blazer. Arthur said that Peggy 
had been drinking alcoholic beverages all day and he believed that 
she was highly intoxicated. 
While I was speaking to Arthur at approx. 1821 hours, I saw Peggy 
drive up in her white Chevy Blazer traveling eastbound on 
Riverview Dr. I flagged Peggy down and told her to pull into the 
driveway so I could speak to her. While I was speaking to her I 
could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath. 
I advised her to drive down the driveway in a safe area so I could 
do some further investigation. Peggy was slurring her speech, had 
glassy and bloodshot eyes, and seemed confused. 
I asked Peggy to step out of the vehicle. Peggy stepped out of the 
vehicle. I told Peggy to stay by her car so I could speak to Arthur. 
Peggy continued to say, "What are you doing here[?]" I advised 
Peggy that I was here to investigate a domestic dispute between 
her and her son, Arthur. I also advised Peggy that she appeared to 
be intoxicated and she was driving her vehicle on a public roadway. 
While I was speaking to Arthur, Peggy went into the house. Dep. 
Vrevich arrived on scene to assist me in my investigation. I advised 
Dep. Vrevich that Peggy went into the house when she was told to 
stay outside. Dep. Vrevich and I entered the house through the 
front door to reestablish contact with Peggy. 
Peggy said that she did not know what was going on and she said 
she did not know what was wrong with her driving her vehicle after 
she had a couple of drinks. Peggy said that she went to the 
Stateline to buy a pack of cigarettes and came back home. I told 
Peggy that I believed that she was intoxicated and that I would 
need to so dome Standardized Field Sobriety Tests on her. Peggy 
agreed and I conducted the following tests on a level gravel 
driveway outside of Peggy's home. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, "Page 2 of 3"; Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.27, L.21 - p.30, L.19.) After 
she performed poorly on the field sobriety tests, Finnicum was arrested. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, "Page 3 of 3".) 
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The magistrate denied Finnicum's motion to suppress and her subsequent 
motion for reconsideration. (R., pp.32, 35-36, 41, 112-116; Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.32, 
L.10 - p.33, L.19.) When denying Finnicum's motion to suppress, the magistrate 
specifically found a detention had been effected when Deputy McFarland told 
Finnicum to stay by her car so he could investigate the domestic and the DUI, 
and, relying on State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 103 P.3d 430 (2004), found 
Finnicum was not protected by the Fourth Amendment when she attempted to 
defeat the purpose of the lawful detention by entering her house after the 
detention had been initiated. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.32, L.10 - p.33, L.17.) Upon 
denying Finnicum's motion to reconsider, the magistrate found, as an alternative 
basis for its denial of Finnicum's motion to suppress, that the officers also 
possessed probable cause to arrest Finnicum for DUI, and entered her home 
under the exigent circumstances exception. (R., pp.41, 59-60, 65-71, 102-103, 
105-109, 119-120.) 
Finnicum entered a conditional guilty plea, by which she reserved her right 
to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.41-46.) The magistrate 
entered judgment and placed Finnicum on probation for a term of two years. (R., 
pp.47-48.) Finnicum timely appealed, and the magistrate granted her motion to 
have her sentence stayed pending her appeal. (R., pp.49-54.) 
The district court reversed the magistrate's order denying Finnicum's 
motion to suppress. (R., pp.117-120; App. Hrg., p.28, L.1 - p.38. L.21.) In so 
ordering, the district court first found "I clearly think Maland stands for the 
proposition that the Terry investigation once commenced outside the home 
3 
cannot pursue a suspect into the home to complete that Terry investigation." 
(App. Hrg., p.29, L.11 - p.30, L.17.) The district court also ruled that, while the 
totality of the circumstances known to the officers before Finnicum entered the 
house gave them probable cause to arrest Finnicum for DUI, because the 
officers did not testify that they entered Finnicum's house specifically to retrieve 
her to prevent the destruction of her BAC evidence, the exigent circumstances 
exception could not apply. (R., pp.119-120; App. Hrg. Tr., p.30, L.18 - p.38, 
L.17.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp.121-124.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it reversed the magistrate's order denying 
Finnicum's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Committed Error When It Did Not Affirm The Magistrate's 
Denial Of Finnicum's Motion To Suppress 
A Introduction 
The district court reversed the magistrate's order denying Finnicum's 
motion to suppress, finding 1) the entry of Finnicum's home by the officers 
unlawful even though they initiated the detention outside of Finnicum's home and 
entered only when Finnicum decided to ignore Deputy McFarland's lawful order 
to remain with her car while he completed his investigation and 2) the officers 
possessed probable cause to believe Finnicum had driven under the influence 
but that the officers were required to specifically articulate that they entered the 
home to prevent the destruction of the BAC evidence before the exigent 
circumstances exception could apply. Because Idaho law is clear that an 
individual may not defeat the purpose of a lawful detention by escaping into their 
home, the district court's order must be reversed. Further, Idaho case law is 
clear that the evanescent nature of BAC evidence warrants the application of the 
exigent circumstances exception, and nothing in Idaho law requires an officer to 
testify that he held a subjective fear that the BAC evidence would dissipate 
before the exception may apply. Finally, because the officers possessed 
probable cause to believe Finnicum had committed the crime of driving under the 
influence, they were entitled, under the hot pursuit exception, to follow Finnicum 
into her home when she tried to escape her detention. The magistrate's legal 
conclusions, flowing logically from the uncontested facts, should have been 
affirmed by the district court. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, _, 184 P.3d 215, 218 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, _ 183 P.3d 758, 760 
(2008)). "Thus, we consider here whether the district court committed error with 
respect to the issues presented." In re Daniel W., _Idaho_, 183 P.3d 765 
(2008). 
C. The Magistrate Correctly Found That Deputy McFarland Acted Within His 
Authority In Following Finnicum Into Her House To Resume The Terrv 
Stop The Officer Had Already Initiated And Effected In A Public Place 
Contrary to the finding of the district court, State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 
817, 103 P .3d 430 (2004 ), does not stand for the proposition that a suspect 
whom officers have detained outside her house may avoid that detention by 
fleeing into her home. The magistrate correctly applied the holding in Maland, 
finding that it did not prohibit the actions of the deputies in this case. The district 
court should have affirmed the magistrate's denial of Finnicum's motion to 
suppress. 
In State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 824, 103 P.3d 430, 437 (2004), this 
Court held that "[a] Terry stop may not be effectuated by a warrantless, 
nonconsensual entry into a residence or place of business without probable 
cause for a felony and exigent circumstances." Relying on Maland, the district 
court concluded that even where an officer has initiated and effected a lawful 
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Terry stop in a public place, the person detained may escape from the officer and 
flee into a house and the officer is powerless to pursue the detainee. (App. Hrg. 
Tr., p.30, Ls.14-17 .) Contrary to the district court's opinion, however, this result, 
which virtually invites suspects to defy lawful police authority, is neither 
supported nor compelled by the result reached in Maland. 
In Maland, officers were dispatched to a residence in response to a noise 
complaint. Maland, 140 Idaho at 818, 103 P.3d at 431. The officers knocked on 
the door and Maland answered. Id. The officers asked Maland to produce 
identification and to disclose whether he owned the home. Id. at 819, 103 P.3d 
at 432. Maland claimed that he had no identification and gave the officers a false 
name. Id. The officers were suspicious that Maland was not being truthful and, 
when Maland attempted to terminate the encounter by closing the door, one of 
the officers blocked the door by putting her foot between the door and the 
doorjamb, and both officers pushed against the door. Id. Maland relented, came 
out of the house and revealed his true identity. Id. He was subsequently 
arrested on an outstanding bench warrant. .[g. 
This Court reversed Maland's conviction, holding that officers violated 
Maland's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion when they crossed the threshold of Maland's residence to effectuate a 
Terry stop. Id. at 819-823, 103 P.3d at 432-36. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court found it significant that the officers' first show of authority occurred 
simultaneously with their entry into Maland's residence. lQ. at 820-22, 103 P .3d 
at 433-35. The Court also concluded that, unlike the defendant in United States 
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v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976), Maland was in a private place when police 
encountered him because, in contrast to Santana who exposed herself to public 
view voluntarily, Maland only opened the door in response to the officers' knock. 
Id. at 822-23, 103 P.3d at 435-36. Concluding that Santana did not sanction the 
entry into Maland's home, the Court overruled its prior decisions in State v. 
Manthei, 103 Idaho 237, 939 P.2d 556 (1997), and State v. Hinson, 132 Idaho 
110,967 P.2d 724 (1998), and held that law enforcement officers may not enter 
a home to effectuate a Terry stop in the absence of probable cause for an arrest, 
exigent circumstances or consent. Maland, 140 Idaho at 823, 103 P.3d at 436. 
Contrary to the district court's determination in this case, and consistent 
with the magistrate's determination, Maland does not stand for the broad 
proposition that a Terry stop never justifies a warrantless entry into a suspect's 
residence. Maland and the cases it overruled all involved situations where the 
police initiated the Terry stop while the defendant was in a private place, i.e. 
standing in or near an open doorway in response to the officer's knock. In this 
case, however, the officer initiated (and effected) the Terry stop while Finnicum 
was on the roadway and in her driveway, places where Finnicum clearly had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 42. In such a 
situation, there is no rational basis to distinguish between the entry into a home 
to complete a probable cause-based arrest initiated in a public place, which the 
Supreme Court approved in Santana, and the entry into the home to complete a 
Terry stop that was initiated and even effected in a public place but from which 
the defendant fled. In such a stop, as in an arrest, "the officer communicates to 
9 
the detainee, either orally or through a show of force or authority, that he is not 
free to go about his business." State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 827, 839 
P.2d 1237, 1241 (Ct. App. 1992). "Any investigative stop necessarily involves a 
brief period of detention." Consequently, "[a] suspect cannot defeat the purpose 
of a stop simply by walking away from it." State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 220, 
677 P.2d 522, 533 (Ct. App. 1984) (Burnett, J., and Walters, C.J., concurring). 
The district court's decision to expand the holding of Maland to preclude 
officers from entering a home to continue a lawful investigative stop when the 
stop is initiated and effected in a public place but the suspect flees inside the 
home before the investigation can be completed is contrary to the decisions of 
several other courts that have addressed this question. See, e.g., Alto v. City of 
Chicago, 863 F.Supp. 658, 661-62 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("an officer who stops a 
person because of a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity need 
not terminate the stop merely because the suspect flees to his home") (citations 
omitted); Harbin v. City of Alexandria, 712 F.Supp. 67, 71-72 (E.D. Va. 1989) 
(Terry stop need not end when suspect walks from porch into house), aff'd 908 
F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990) (unpublished); State v. Nikola, 821 A.2d 110 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (officer permitted to follow defendant into garage to 
continue lawful investigative detention initiated in defendant's driveway); People 
v. Riviera, 598 N.E.2d 423, 427 (111. App. 2d 1992) (police may make a 
warrantless entry into a private premises for the purpose of effectuating a Terry 
stop provided the police have a lawful basis to stop a suspect in a public place 
and the suspect reacts by suddenly fleeing to a private sanctuary, thereby 
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thwarting any opportunity to conduct the detention at a public location); Edwards 
v. United States, 364 A.2d 1209, 1214 (D.C. 1976) (officers did not violate Fourth 
Amendment by following suspects into apartment to complete Terry stop initiated 
on the street), aff'd on alternative grounds on reh'g, 379 A.2d 976 (D.C. 1977). 
Relying on Santana, these courts recognize, generally, that once an officer 
attempts in a public place to validly detain a suspect on reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, the suspect cannot thwart the lawful police action by simply 
retreating to a private place. 
There is nothing in the Maland decision that dictates the result reached by 
the district court in this case. The magistrate correctly applied the law to the 
stipulated facts - that Finnicum was detained outside her home when she 
submitted to Deputy McFarland's order that she remain by her car and that 
officers followed her into her home after she later retreated into her home - and 
determined that Finnicum could not defeat the purpose of the lawful. Terry stop by 
escaping into her house. Because the Terry stop in this case was initiated 
outside Finnicum's residence, Maland is inapplicable. The district court 
committed error when it reversed the magistrate's correct application of the law 
to the facts. 
D. It Is Well-Established That The Exigent Circumstances Exception Applies 
Where Officers Have Probable Cause To Believe A Suspect Has Been 
Driving Under The Influence 
In response to Finnicum's motion to reconsider her motion to suppress, 
the magistrate reiterated its earlier basis for denying the motion and further 
articulated an alternative basis for denying Finnicum's motion to suppress: the 
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officers' warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances because they 
had probable cause to arrest Finnicum for DUI. (R., pp.41, 59-60, 65-71, 102-
103, 105-109, 119-120.) The district court reversed the magistrate's denial of 
Finnicum's motion to suppress on this basis also. The district court did so on the 
basis of its belief that, despite the magistrate's finding that the deputies had 
probable cause to arrest Finnicum for DUI before she escaped into her home, the 
deputies were also required to testify that they had a subjective fear that the BAC 
evidence would dissipate if they took the time to obtain a warrant to enter 
Finnicum's home to re-seize her before the exigent circumstances exception will 
apply. (R, pp.119-120; App. Hrg. Tr., p.34, Ls.21-23, p.36, L.15 - p.38, L.17.) 
The district court committed error when it reversed the magistrate's correct ruling, 
because the exigent circumstances exception to alcohol-content evidence is 
applied according to an objective standard, and does not depend on the 
subjective beliefs or fears of the officer. 
The seminal case recognizing this particular exigency is Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), in which the facts set forth by the court did not 
include any testimony by the officer about any subjective fear that the evidence 
would dissipate if he had to obtain a warrant for a blood draw while investigating 
a DUI. After finding that the intrusion of a blood draw to determine BAC was 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that the exigent 
circumstances exception applied to alcohol-content evidence based on its 
application of an objective view of the circumstances, rather than any motivation 
articulated by the officer: 
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The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have 
believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the 
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, 
threatened 'the destruction of evidence.' We are told that the 
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after 
drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the 
system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be 
taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the 
scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate 
and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that 
the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case 
was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-771 (citations removed) (emphasis supplied). 
Likewise, the Idaho cases discussing the evanescent nature of alcohol-
content evidence apply the exigent circumstances exception according to an 
objective standard, without reference to officer testimony. Indeed, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has referred to this as "an inherent exigency." State v. Woolery, 
116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989). Citing Woolery, the Court of 
Appeals emphasized the widespread acceptance of the application of the exigent 
circumstances exception to this evidence: 
The exigent circumstances exception allows agents of the State to 
conduct a warrantless search when there is a "compelling need for 
official action and no time to secure a warrant." Michigan v. Tyler, 
436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 56 L.Ed.2d 486, 498 
(1978); State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 624, 768 P.2d 1351, 1357 
(Ct.App.1989). It is well established that blood draws to test for 
alcohol concentration fall within this exigency exception because 
blood alcohol content diminishes over time, and valuable evidence 
would be lost in the time required to obtain a warrant. Schmerber, 
384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. at 1835-36, 16 L.Ed.2d at 919-20; 
State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368,370,775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989); 
State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 700-01, 39 P.3d 637, 640-41 
(Ct.App.2001 ); Curtis, 106 Idaho at 489, 680 P .2d at 1389. 
State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472, 65 P.3d 211, 213 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(emphasis supplied). See also State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 163 P.3d 1208 
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(Ct. App. 2007) (court applied "objective standard" and found, given the specific, 
articulable facts reasonably indicating imminent destruction of evidence, that 
exigent circumstances justified officers' immediate entry into home to effect 
arrest of person whom they had probable cause to believe had just committed 
DUI and who refused to allow come outside for field sobriety tests or to allow 
officers into her home to perform the tests). 
The district court reversed the magistrate's correct ruling based on its 
incorrect belief that application of the exigent circumstances exception required 
the officers to testify to their subjective fear that the alcohol-content evidence 
might dissipate. The district court should have affirmed the magistrate's correct 
ruling on this basis. Its order reversing the magistrate on this basis was error. 
E. The Hot Pursuit Exception To The Warrant Requirement Authorized The 
Officers' To Follow Finnicum When She Retreated Into Her Home 
The district court correctly found that the magistrate court was correct 
when it found the officers possessed probable cause to believe Finnicum had 
committed the crime of driving under the influence before she entered her house 
after having been told by Deputy McFarland to remain by her car in the driveway. 
(App. Hrg. Tr., p.34, Ls.21-23, p.38, Ls.13-14.) Because the officers had 
probable cause to believe Finnicum had committed DUI and had communicated 
to Finnicum that she was no longer free to choose to terminate her encounter 
with law enforcement, they were authorized to follow her into her home under the 
hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement. The district court should have 
upheld the magistrate's order suppressing evidence on this alternative basis. 
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See State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 848,850, 807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct App. 1991) 
(on appellate review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of 
being upheld on any theory); State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 818, 10 P.3d 
1285, 1287 (2000), overruled on other grounds by State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 
88 P.3d 704 (2004) (appellate court gives due consideration, but not deference, 
to the district court's appellate determination). 
Having probable cause to believe that Finnicum had just driven while 
under the influence, Deputy McFarland was entitled to arrest Finnicum without a 
warrant. Finnicum attempted to thwart an arrest by retreating to her house. 
Finnicum could not do so, however, because the arrest had been set in motion in 
a public place. State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 768 P.2d 1351 (Ct App. 1989) 
(police in whose presence a nonviolent misdemeanor has occurred may pursue 
offender into his home and arrest him there without a warrant if the pursuit is 
triggered by flight from a lawful arrest outside the home). 
As explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Wren: 
An arrest occurs when it is communicated, not when the officer 
decides to take such action. No particular acts, words or formulaic 
expressions are required; however, the communication must be 
sufficient to inform a reasonable person that he is no longer free to 
choose between terminating or continuing his encounter with the 
law enforcement officers. 
Wren, 115 Idaho at 626 n. 8, 768 P.2d at 1359 n.8 (citations omitted). 
Thus, in United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976), the United States 
Supreme Court held that Santana's arrest had been set in motion in a "public" 
place (i.e., Santana's doorway) when officers, having probable cause to arrest, 
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did no more than display their identification and shout, "police." Santana, 427 
U.S. at 43. 
In this case, Deputy McFarland clearly conveyed to Finnicum that she was 
no longer free to choose between terminating or continuing her encounter with 
the law enforcement officers. Deputy McFarland Told Finnicum that he was 
· investigating the domestic dispute, that she appeared intoxicated and had just 
driven her car on a public roadway, and, most importantly, told her to stay by her 
car while he spoke to her son, the person reporting both the domestic dispute 
and Finnicum's DUI. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, "page 2 of 3".) Under these 
circumstances, no reasonable person would believe that she was "free to choose 
between terminating or continuing [her] encounter" with the police. Wren, 115 
Idaho at 626 n. 8, 768 P.2d at 1359 n. 8; see also State v. Jenkins, 143 Idaho 
918,922, 155 P.3d 1157, 1161 (2007) (when officers turned on overhead lights 
while Jenkins was still in his car in his driveway, they acted on probable cause to 
arrest in a public place, regardless of whether they articulated this exact 
purpose). 
Because Deputy McFarland had probable cause to arrest Finnicum, and 
because he communicated to Finnicum in a public place that she was not free to 
terminate the police encounter, Finnicum could not escape the otherwise lawful 
arrest by retreating to his garage. The order of the magistrate denying 
Finnicum's motion to suppress can also be upheld on this basis. Morris, 119 
Idaho at 850, 807 P.2d at 1288 (on appellate review, the lower court's ruling must 
be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any theory); Hammersley, 134 Idaho 
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at 818, 10 P.3d at 1287 (appellate court gives due consideration, but not 
deference, to the district court's appellate determination). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's order 
reversing the magistrate's order denying Finnicum's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 2nd day of September, 2008. 
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